In this note we revisit the famous result of Shannon [Sha49] stating that any encryption scheme with perfect security against computationally unbounded attackers must have a secret key as long as the message. This result motivated the introduction of modern encryption schemes, which are secure only against a computationally bounded attacker, and allow some small (negligible) advantage to such an attacker. It is a well known folklore that both such relaxations -limiting the power of the attacker and allowing for some small advantage -are necessary to overcome Shannon's result. To our surprise, we could not find a clean and well documented proof of this folklore belief. (In fact, two proofs are required, each showing that only one of the two relaxations above is not sufficient.) Most proofs we saw either made some limiting assumptions (e.g., encryption is deterministic), or proved a much more complicated statement (e.g., beating Shannon's bound implies the existence of one-way functions [IL89].)
Definitions
Some Notation. In general, we use capital letters for random variables, and lower case letters for specific values; e.g., M, C, S denote appropriately defined random messages, ciphertexts and keys, while m, c, s denote some specific value of those. When A is a probabilistic algorithm taking input x, we write Y ← A(x) to denote the random variable A(x; R) for uniformly random R. When X itself it a random variable, we write Y ← A(X). Finally, we use calligraphic letters for message spaces; e.g., key space S and message space M.
Encryption. Let (Gen, Enc, Dec) be any encryption scheme with key space S and message space M. The key generation algorithm Gen outputs a secret key s chosen according to some key distribution S over S. In most common schemes S is simply uniform over S, but our results hold for any key distribution S, so we will not assume that S must be uniform.
The encryption algorithm Enc takes a key s ∈ S, a message m ∈ M, and outputs ciphertext C ← Enc s (m). We stress that we allow the encryption algorithm Enc to be probabilistic, so C is really Enc s (m; R) for random coins R. Luckily, we structure our proofs in a way which will easily handle this case, without explicitly talking about the random coins R. In particular, to simplify the notation, when some encryption is computed inside some probability, we do not explicitly put the choice or R under Pr; for example, Pr S [Enc S (m) = c] really means Pr S,R [Enc S (m; R) = c]. We will assume that the message m is chosen from some distribution M over M which is independent of the key distribution S ← Gen().
The (possibly probabilistic) decryption algorithm Dec takes a ciphertext c and a key s and outputs the decryptionM ← Dec s (c). Ordinarily, we require perfect correctness stating that for any m ∈ M and s ∈ S we have Dec s (Enc s (m)) = m. However, since we are proving a lower bound, we relax the correctness guarantee to allow for some small decryption error γ.
Security. There are many equivalent formulations of "perfect" Shannon's security, when the attacker Eve is allowed to be computationally unbounded, and the "advantage" of any such Eve must be 0. Roughly, these definitions can be partitioned into two types. Some, including Shannon's original notion [Sha49] , use the notions of Shannon's entropy and mutual information (see Section 4). While elegant and easy to state, it is not obvious how to relax such notions to computationally bounded attackers. 1 Other definitions, inspired by the Goldwasser-Micali [GM84] notions of semantic security and indistinguishability, are based on statistical distance. Such definitions have a clean and natural extensions to both computationally bounded attackers and non-zero advantage. Therefore, our definition below will be of this type. Since we are proving a lower bound, we will state what we feel is the weakest such definition. Of course, since our lower bound will be so strong even for such "weak-looking" definition, it will imply lower bounds for other, stronger definitions.
Definition 2 An encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec) is called (t, ε)-secure on message distribution M if for there exists a random variable Y (independent of M ) such that for any (possibly probabilistic) adversary Eve running in time at most t, it holds
An encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec) is called (t, ε)-secure if it is (t, ε)-secure on all message distributions M . When Eve is allowed to be computationally unbounded (e.g., t = ∞), we say that (Gen, Enc, Dec) is ε-secure. ♦
Few Remarks on the Definition
We make a few remarks on our definition. These remarks can be skipped by readers who already find the definition to be natural (and such readers can directly move to Section 2). Intuitively, our definition states that whatever bit of information about M Eve could derive from the actual ciphertext C, she could have also derived from some random variable Y which is independent of M . Thus, Eve did not learn any new information from the ciphertext which she could not have learned from simply knowing the a-priori message distribution M (and some side information Y independent of M ). However, while restricting Eve to run in time at most t, we do not make any restrictions on the complexity of sampling this independent distribution Y , and do not "charge" Eve for sampling Y . In particular, we do not insist on setting Y ← Enc S (M ′ ), where M ′ is a fresh independent sample of M . Similarly, for general (t, ε)-security, we allow different Y 's for different M 's. Once again, such relaxations are done to make our lower bound stronger.
Also notice that the above definition is trivially true for any "singleton" distribution M ← m, for any m ∈ M, and seems getting harder and harder as M becomes more and more "well-spread" (see Theorem 2 how this intuition translates to our lower bound). Still, even for the most "wellspread" uniform distribution M over M, although we will see that our definition implies a strong bound on the size of the key space (Theorem 1), the definition is still noticeably weaker than general (t, ε)-security for all message distributions. For example, modifying a secure encryption (such as one-time pad) to be identity on some fixed m ∈ M, still leaves the encryption very secure on the uniform distribution, while making the encryption of m easily distinguishable from encryptions of all other messages m ′ . In contrast, the general definition of security against all distributions is easily seen to be equivalent (ignoring factor of 2 in ε) to security against all distributions M m,m ′ , for all m, m ′ ∈ M, where each M m,m ′ is uniform over a pair of messages {m, m ′ }. In turn, the latter definition is simply the classical definition of (t, ε)-indistinguishability of Goldwasser-Micali [GM84] , which states that for any messages m, m ′ ∈ M, and any adversary Eve running in time at most t, it holds | Pr
We refer to [IO11] for discussions of several other nearly equivalent forms of "indistinguishabilitybased" security (such as semantic security) for one-time symmetric-key encryption, and stress that our lower bound easily holds for all such notions. We also discuss a natural "mutual-informationbased" definition in Section 4.
show an elegant extension of this result confirming that, in order to beat the Shannon bound in a non-trivial way, one must simultaneously restrict Eve to be efficient, as well as allow for some non-zero (but possibly negligible) probability ε of security failure. Just like the Shannon's original bound, our bounds will already follow by restricting M to be the uniform distribution. Our proof also handles decryption error γ.
Theorem 1 Let M be the uniform distribution over M, and assume (Gen, Enc, Dec) is (1 − γ)-correct on M . Then:
• Small error needed. Let v denote maximum bit length of a plaintext plus ciphertext.
Proof of First Part. Let Y be the distribution on ciphertexts guaranteed by Definition 2, so that Equation (2) holds with ε = 0 for any Eve running in time at most v. We claim that this implies that the joint distribution (M,
To show this formally, for any fixed message m ∈ M and ciphertext c, consider the following Using the fact that M is uniform and independent from Y , the above is equivalent to
Since the above holds for all m and c, the distribution Enc S (m) ≡ Y for all m ∈ M, which means that the ciphertext distribution is the same for all messages. In particular, going back to the uniform distribution M , we have (M, Enc S (M )) ≡ (M, Y ), as claimed in Equation (4). 2 Now, pick a fresh uniformly random key S ′ and look at 3
On the one hand, it is clear that
2 In essence, we showed a more general fact: to conclude that two distributions A and B are identical, it is sufficient to show that they are (t, 0)-indistinguishable, for t equal to the maximum description length of any element in the support of A and B.
3 Note, if S ← Gen() is not uniform, S ′ has a different distribution than S.
since M is uniform and Dec S ′ (Y ) is independent of M . On the other hand, we know that the distribution (M, Y ) is identical to (M, Enc S (M )). Hence, we can rewrite Equation (5) as
Here Equation (7) followed from the fact that the distribution of S conditioned on the event S = S ′ is the same as the original distribution S, since S ′ is uniform. On the other hand, Equation (8) followed from Equation (1) and, again, the fact that S ′ is uniform, so Pr[S = S ′ ] = 1/|S|.
Comparing the resulting inequality above with Equation (6), we get
Proof of Second Part. We show that (|S|d, ε)-security implies |S| ≥ |M|(1 − ε − γ). As before, let Y be the ciphertext distribution guaranteed by Definition 2. Consider the following attacker Eve of complexity t = |S|d:
Eve(m, c): Run Dec s (c) for all s ∈ S. Output 1 if and only if at least one answer was m.
Now, let us compute both probabilities when we apply Equation (2) to this Eve. First,
where the last inequality used Equation (1). By Equation (2), we get
On the other hand,
However, M is uniform over M and, for any s ∈ S, Dec s (Y ) is independent of M . Thus,
Combining Equation (9) and Equation (10), we get 1 − ε − γ ≤ |S| |M| or |S| ≥ |M|(1 − ε − γ).
Tightness. Both bounds are nearly tight, which can be shown by tweaking the generalization of the one-time pad (OTP) encryption for general cardinality N message spaces (not just the power of 2, which can be accomplished by addition modulo N ). For simplicity, we only do it for two special cases ε = 0 and γ = 0, leaving the common generalization as a (tedious) exercise. For both cases we will actually satisfy the stronger (t, ε)-indistinguishability given by Equation (3). First, assume ε = 0. Take any |M| of cardinality N , and any subset M 0 ⊆ M of cardinality N (1 − γ). Start with the OTP scheme over M 0 (so that |S| = N (1 − γ) as well), and enlarge it to all of M by taking any fixed m 0 ∈ M 0 and defining Enc s (m 1 ) = Enc s (m 0 ), for m 1 ∈ M\M 0 . The addition of these γN messages (which decrypt incorrectly) to our OTP does not affect the security of the scheme (since Enc(m 0 ) is perfectly secure), but creates a decryption error with probability γ, and with |S| = |M|(1 − γ).
Second, assume γ = 0. Now, for any M of cardinality N , take the OTP for M (so that |S| = N ), and simply remove εN/2 keys from S, defining the actual set S 0 of N (1 − ε/2) keys, and sampling a random key s from S 0 . To argue the Ω(ε)-security of this scheme, one can imagine sampling a key s ← S 0 by first sampling the key s ← S and claiming that Eve unconditionally won the game if s ∈ S\S 0 . Equivalently, we can always actually run Eve on a fully uniform key s from S, but then declare Eve victorious anyway if s ∈ S\S 0 . Clearly, when s is fully uniform, Eve has probability exactly 1/2 telling apart encryptions of m 0 from m 1 , so now her probability is at most 1/2 + ε/2, creating distinguishing advantage at most ε with |S 0 | = |M|(1 − ε/2).
Some Extensions
The result of the previous section was completely elementary, did not explicitly use any technical notions such as entropy, statistical distance, etc., and could be easily taught in the first lecture of an undergraduate class (especially for the case of perfect correctness γ = 0). In this section we make several elementary "entropy-extensions" of our main result.
Extension to general M
We observe that Theorem 1 easily generalizes to arbitrary message distributions M (as opposed to the uniform distribution), as follows. We define the min-entropy of M to be
. Examining now the proofs of both parts of Theorem 1, we see that the only places where the uniformity of M was used were Equation (6) and Equation (10). In both cases, we needed to upped bound Pr[M ′ = M ] for some probability distribution M ′ which was independent of M (e.g., M ′ = Dec S ′ (Y ) for Equation (6) and M ′ = Dec s (Y ) for Equation (10)). Hence, we get the following analog of Theorem 1 where |M| is replaced by 2 H∞(M ) .
Theorem 2 Let M be the any distribution over M, and assume (Gen, Enc, Dec) is (1 − γ)-correct on M . Then:
• Small time needed. Let d denote maximum decryption time.
Notice, this bound is tight, in general, by taking M to be uniform over some subset M ′ of M of cardinality 2 H∞(M ) , and then doing the OTP scheme over M ′ .
Slightly Stronger Bound for Perfect Completeness and Perfect Security
Recall, the bounds of Theorem 1 (and more general Theorem 2) held for any key distribution S ← Gen(), but only gave lower bounds of the cardinality of S (or, more generally, on cardinality of the support set of S). In contrast, as we recap in Section 4 below, Shannon's original bound [Sha49] gave the lower bound on the Shannon entropy H 1 (S) of S, which could be stronger for sufficiently non-uniform S. Here we observe that our proof for the first part of Theorem 1 can be strengthened to give the lower bound on the min-entropy H ∞ (S) for the case of perfect correctness γ = 0. For elegance, we right away state the improved bound for general message distribution M as well. 
Proof: We follow the same proof as in Theorem 1 (and its extension to general M in Theorem 2), except we define the value S ′ to be the most likely value s of the key S, instead of being uniform. Namely, we set S ′ = s satisfying Pr[S = s] = 2 −H∞(S) . Then, the value ∆ becomes
We can argue, as before, that ∆ ≤ 2 −H∞(M ) , since M is independent of Dec s (Y ). On the other hand, since the distribution (M, Y ) is identical to (M, Enc S (M )) and we have perfect completeness, we get
where Equation (11) used the definition of s and the perfect correctness of the encryption. Combining the two bounds on ∆, we get 2
As we recap in Section 4 below, when ε = 0 our definition is equivalent to the original definition of Shannon [Sha49] , who showed the bound H 1 (S) ≥ log |M|, where H 1 is Shannon's entropy. Since log |S| ≥ H 1 (S) ≥ H ∞ (S), we can view the last bound of Theorem 3 as a nice strengthening of Shannon's original bound for perfect security (and perfect correctness): 4 not only H 1 (S) ≥ log |M|, but also H ∞ (S) ≥ log |M|.
Bounds for Mutual Information Based Definition
The Shannon entropy of a random variable X is defined as H 1 (X)
We also define conditional Shannon entropy of a random variable X conditioned on another random variable Z by
where E z←Z denotes the expected value over z ← Z. It is well known that H 1 (X) ≥ H 1 (X|Z) ≥ 0. The mutual information between X and Y is I(X; Y ) def = H 1 (X) − H 1 (X|Y ). It is well known that I(X; Y ) = I(Y ; X) ≥ 0. The conditional mutual information of X and Y given Z is defined analogously. We assume the reader is familiar with other elementary facts about Shannon entropy and mutual information (such as the chain rule used below); see [CT06] .
Let (Gen, Enc, Dec) be encryption scheme, S be it key distribution Gen(), M be some message distribution and C ← Enc S (M ). We now give the following natural definitions generalizing the original definitions of [Sha49] to imperfect correctness and security. where the equalities used the definitions and the chain rule, and the last inequality used the facts that H 1 (S|C) ≤ H 1 (S) and H 1 (S|(M, C)) ≥ 0. As a corollary, we get the following straightforward extension of Shannon's result:
Theorem 5 If (Gen, Enc, Dec) is ε ′ -Shannon secure and (1 − γ ′ )-Shannon correct on M , then
In particular, if M is the uniform distribution over M, then H 1 (S) ≥ log |M| − γ ′ − ε ′ .
